for the study of the contribution to the clash of ideas, using documents from former Communist archives.

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MICHAEL E. LATHAM. *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era*. (The New Cold War History.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2000. Pp. xii, 288. Cloth $45.00, paper $18.95.

Michael E. Latham's new book contributes to a rich literature on the history of science and the U.S. state. But where the preponderance of this work looks at such issues as federal patronage for science and the role of the government in shaping avenues of investigation and the social organization of science, Latham explores the use of social science as a tool in making foreign policy. More specifically, the book is concerned with the ways in which modernization theory and theorists shaped and justified federal Cold War policies and practices vis-à-vis "less developed nations." Latham provides detailed studies of the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, and the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam, exploring how modernization theory defined the contours of these programs and blinded policy makers and civil servants to their shortcomings. Latham points to the role of the media in legitimizing these initiatives, suggests the historical resonance the modernization-based approach to U.S. Cold War policies had with earlier colonial and neocolonial forays, and argues that these policies embodied widely shared cultural assumptions.

Originating in the immediate post-World War II period, modernization theory was viewed by many social scientists as a means of uniting diverse fields with a comprehensive framework that would provide a rigorous, scientific basis for empirically understanding social, economic, and political development. But Latham contends that modernization was more than just a scholarly model that attempted to explain the natural and inevitable socioeconomic trajectory of nation states from traditional to modern. It was "also an ideology, a conceptual framework that articulated a common collection of assumptions about the nature of American society and its ability to transform a world perceived as both materially and culturally deficient" (p. 5). Modernization theorists and their policy-making allies, according to Latham, saw this social science theory as a means of promoting liberal social values, capitalist economic organization, and democratic political structures to poor and "traditional" nations, allowing the U.S. simultaneously to halt the spread of communism.

Despite the ultimate inevitability of the path to modernity, scholars and policy makers believed that the process could be destabilizing, leaving traditional societies vulnerable to communist influence. The job of the U.S., then, was to facilitate the modernization process and help protect Third World citizens from its harsh effects. This was the goal of such programs as the Alliance for Progress. Initiated in 1961, this undertaking sought to eliminate poverty and political repression in Latin America, bringing Western values to the region and thus weakening communist impulses.

At the same time, despite the guidance of ostensibly objective science, the deeply held assumptions of Cold War policy makers and modernization theorists about the virtues of the path of U.S. development blinded them to the deficiencies of programs like the Alliance for Progress. Initiative failures and advocates' inability to recognize them are clearly evident in the case of the Strategic Hamlet Program, a collaborative effort with the government of South Vietnam. This enterprise involved forcibly moving peasants from dispersed villages into more concentrated locations. Beyond the military advantages of such a strategy, the aim of this effort was to facilitate economic development and the emergence of a democratic political culture, thereby thwarting communism. As Latham shows, however, the program was often associated with political repression and exploitative labor practices. But in the face of evidence of program failure, U.S. government policy makers overlooked these and other shortcomings. Committed to modernization as ideology, they never examined program objectives or theoretical underpinnings but instead saw difficulties as arising from inadequate administration.

This book does a nice job of capturing the crude paternalism embodied in U.S. Cold War policy and in providing illustrations of how an inadequately examined commitment to the premises of a supposedly objective and scientific theory led involved actors to ignore the shortcomings and failures of Cold War policy initiatives. Latham's evidence of the close links between U.S. foreign policies and earlier colonial and neocolonial initiatives is more superficial, and his contention that U.S. policies reflected widely held cultural assumptions among the American citizenry about international economic development and the U.S. role in it is virtually undocumented. That said, Latham provides a detailed, clear, and largely well-supported study of several important U.S. Cold War foreign policies and their connections to modernization theory.

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GARY GERSTLE. *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2001. Pp. xv, 454. $29.95.

In our times, we no longer take the idea of nationalism for granted. A concept that was once so powerful as to seem natural is now dissected by scholars who seek to learn more about its origins, doctrines, transformations, and fate. Historians like Gary Gerstle attempt to understand the complex set of ideas that dominated its core and the manner in which it has changed. This

book represents a major contribution to the massive cross-disciplinary project to understand the history of nationalism in the United States because it confronts head-on both its progressive and dangerous dimensions—and because it explains so well the complex array of interests that struggled to dominate its nature over the course of the twentieth century.

American nationalism for Gerstle represents a mix of a "civic tradition" that attempted to realize ideals of liberty, equality, citizen rights, and democracy, and a virulent "racial" strain that persistently attempted to make second-class citizens out of African Americans, Asian Americans, Mexican Americans, and some European Americans as well. When this formulation of American nationalism was at its apex in the first six decades of the last century, both tendencies operated simultaneously and at full force. Significant leaders of this political movement, like Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt, were actually capable of promoting liberal-democratic ideas while holding racist thoughts.

The Roosevelts, in fact, play a large role in this study. Both were political leaders who worked hard to create a structure of American nationalism that dominated political life before the 1960s. They championed a politics of inclusion and progress under the sign of a powerful and united nation. They welcomed (white) immigrants who were willing to accept the American liberal creed and leave their old world affiliations behind, a strong state that could regulate the market and dispense social justice, and the necessity of war to protect both their liberal-democratic ideals and their cherished sense of national unity. Gerstle makes it clear that two world wars and a Cold War were important agents in sustaining the strength of the "Rooseveltian nation" and its strange alliance of democratic and illiberal impulses. Few Americans in the period entertained political lives outside of this nationalist ideal.

In the 1960s, the Roosevelt vision for the nation began to crumble. Gerstle shows how Martin Luther King Jr., took America up on its promise of equal rights and attacked the racist position. World War II had already energized blacks and made them realize their sacrifices merited more justice than they had been receiving. The massive scale of African-American protest led to an even more aggressive sense of black separatism that Gerstle feels not only disrupted the "unity" of the "Rooseveltian nation" but helped to spread narrower—and less liberal—forms of national thinking to other social groups. When protests over the Vietnam War further advanced attitudes of indifference toward the idea of national unity, according to Gerstle, the "bonds of nationhood" were undermined and the Roosevelt program of nation building was repudiated. In its place stood a weakened nation, divided by debates between supporters of "multiculturalism" and those of a "conservative movement" intent on celebrating the power of the nation but without much of the liberalism of the Roosevelt era.

Celebrating the nation, however, was a continuing problem for all nationalisms, because they inevitably faced the task of disciplining a huge array of personal desires and interests. In American politics, this project was always forced to confront a highly developed sense of individualism or classic liberalism. To his credit, Gerstle has moved beyond the older argument of Louis Hartz that American nationalism was dominated by a liberal ideal alone. And he does recognize in his study the effort of nationalist leaders to discipline the singular person, but ultimately the forces that explode in his crucible are collective rather than individual; progressive movements are challenged by racist or ethnic ones rather than by highly personal impulses emanating from the inner recesses of the human soul. Consequently, this book can provide excellent explanations for the demise of the New Deal coalition in the 1960s, but it does not fully explain the personal agendas that were manifested in the ongoing defense of unfettered capitalism in American politics, the exhaustion with collective identities and the ideal of sacrifice after 1945, the male and female rebellion against marriage, and the massive embrace of mass culture throughout the period of Rooseveltian ascendency.

The relative neglect of individualism as a driving force behind the shaping of American nationalism, moreover, explains, in part, why culture is treated in this book mostly as an appendage of the dominant political world rather than the active agent it was in helping to forge it. For instance, Gerstle cites the films of Frank Capra in the 1930s to suggest that civic nationalism was endorsed in mass culture. And he infers that films and novels after World War II upheld a growing sense of whiteness that came from the military experiences of the war. Except for World War II, however, American mass cultural products such as film offered not simple endorsements of powerful political ideals but mostly contradictory messages fixated on the problems and feelings of individuals. They were marked by the attention they gave to female desire and male frustration toward any sort of authority and as such tended to frame discussions about nationalism and politics in terms of personal identity and behavior. Gangsters and fallen women, for instance, were also prevalent in films of the 1930s and were very much American. One could even argue that, at the end of the twentieth century, the idea of America was shaped as much by the personal projects of millions of individuals as it was by multiculturalists or conservatives.

Finally, Gerstle's account of the growing sense of whiteness of the mass of ordinary citizens—especially second-generation Euro-Americans—in the 1930s and 1940s is not as persuasive as his overall argument of the power of the civic nationalist and racist traditions. He argues that many who voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt saw him as something of a "Nordic father." He also claimed that, during World War II, millions of American men fought in a segregated military, overcame ethnic and religions differences, and acquired an

enhanced sense of whiteness. The evidence used to make these points is circumstantial and based largely on the failure of a novel and a memoir to incorporate African-Americans. Left unexplained is why many of these same people bought tickets to watch Jackie Robinson, joined interracial unions, and expressed outrage over the murder of Emmet Till.

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CAROL POLSGROVE. *Divided Minds: Intellectuals and the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: W. W. Norton. 2001. Pp. xxi, 296. $26.95.

Carol Polsgrove's book reveals that, in the 1950s and 1960s, few white intellectuals, at least those writing in the popular press, supported integration. Newspaper and magazine editors at most supported gradual or token integration. Polsgrove argues that most white intellectuals had a limited and usually distorted understanding of African-American history. Many liberals/moderates were biased and judgmental, seeing blacks as poor, filthy, and illiterate.

After the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954, many blacks expected that the federal government would enforce the decision and that white public opinion would support school integration. Yet neither the press nor the government lent enthusiastic support, and those who supported integration, both black and white, were isolated and often intimidated. Polsgrove interprets civil rights history through the lens of public intellectuals, at least those who found an outlet for their ideas. The press carried pieces by William Faulkner and Robert Penn Warren, who favored caution, but not articles and letters by Lillian Smith, who favored integration. A few southern editors took bold stands for compliance with the *Brown* decision, but most editors stopped short of supporting school integration. Such editors were liberal in that they supported better race relations, an end to violence, and voting rights but conservative in hedging on integration. Polsgrove argues that C. Vann Woodward, whose credentials were impressive, became more moderate as the 1950s unfolded into what he described as a Second Reconstruction. "This was no New Reconstruction," she strangely concludes. "Woodward had simply plucked from his historian's brain a handy phrase bound to have an unfortunate effect on white southerners" (p. 31).

Polsgrove argues correctly that, during the first two years after *Brown*, the press was more interested in listening to conservative whites anguish over school integration than to African Americans chronicle the costs of segregation. She discusses a long list of northern intellectuals, many of them former radicals; few supported integration. Polsgrove's list of white intellectuals who equivocated on integration includes Reinhold Niebuhr, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hannah Arendt as well as the editors of some of the most radical journals.

A number of African-American intellectuals had either joined the Communist Party in the 1930s or 1940s or were sympathetic to its goals. This baggage often discouraged them from taking a bold stand for integration. Southern politicians were quick to brand anyone who supported integration as a communist. While some intellectuals appeared before Congressional committees, others such as Langston Hughes, Ralph Bunche, Righard Wright, Pauli Murray, and Rayford Logan were investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. When the *Brown* decision came down, many black intellectuals, including Wright, Chester Himes, and Ralph Ellison, were abroad.

Some northerners looked at the South fearfully and saw it as an alien place. James Baldwin, for example, went South several times but was always uneasy. Yet Baldwin emerges as the hero of this book. His insights cut through much of the verbosity of the press and of politicians. Polsgrove also has high praise for, among others, Lawrence Dunbar Reddick, Murray, Howard Zinn, Benjamin Mays, and James Silver. The bravery of local people in the South who demonstrated, petitioned, and risked their lives to end segregation outshone the wavering and timid behavior of many intellectuals.

Because many white intellectuals whispered only among themselves, ignored integrationists, and perceived African Americans as passive and content, they failed to see either mounting frustration over the slow pace of change or the anger and contempt that many blacks felt toward whites. When the *New Yorker* published Baldwin's "Letter from a Region of My Mind" in 1963, many whites were shocked to discover the level of black hostility. Several whites responded with what would later be embarrassing replies to Baldwin's essay. Polsgrove also discusses John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy's slighting of the civil rights movement. Indeed, Lyndon B. Johnson comes across as much more informed and sympathetic than the Kennedys.

Across the board the press, northern periodicals, liberals in general, and the federal government seemed feckless and ineffectual. For ten years, a small band of activists carried on the fight for civil rights and kept the flame alive. Intellectuals traded ink but rarely ventured to the front lines of the civil rights movement. As Polsgrove concludes, "the people designated as intellectuals often fail, not only in courage and compassion, but also in vision" (p. 246).

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SIDNEY FINE. *"Expanding the Frontiers of Civil Rights": Michigan, 1948–1968*. (Great Lakes Books.) Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press. 2000. Pp. 441. $34.95.